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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLA l TD]1~ Dl~:~NI~~ 
]Jfaiutiff & llespondent, 
vs. 
THJ~ Dl~N\'"l~H & RIO <JR.ANDE 
\\TJ~:STJ1~R~ RAILROAD COM-
p AXY, a corporation, 




The parties "\\rill bP refPrred to as in the court belo"' .. · 
All italics are ours. 
SrfA~~E~IENT ()F FACTS 
Plaintiff deems it necessary to restate the facts for 
the reason that defendant has not stated the facts as 
they 1nust be vie"\\Ted on app·eal, favorable to respondent. 
Plaintiff brought the suit in question against defend-
ant for damages resulting fron1 the loss of two fingers 
on his left hand as a result of frostbite suffered on 
the night of January ;2 and 3 of 1960, ·w·hile working 
on defendant's mainline track, approximately 16 miles 
"Test of Green River, Utah. Plaintiff complained that 
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2 
defendant was negligent in causing him to become over-
exposed to the unusually cold and freezing weather 
over an unnecessarily and danger,ously long period of 
time without adequate warming facilities. (R 1-3) 
The track maintenance crew of which plaintiff was 
a member was called out on a Saturday night, January 
2, 1960, to repair an open joint. The cre'v consisted 
of the foreman, plus three laborers, one of 'vhom "~as 
the plaintiff. (R 93) There was another man by the 
name of Delmar H. Powell, who frequently worked on 
the crew who was not present at the time in question. 
(R 93) There was another track 1naintenance crew "~hich 
worked out of Cedar. As a matter of fact, the open 
joint in question \vas slightly in the territory of the 
Cedar crew. (R 92, 96) 
A joint is the place "~here two lengths of rail are 
attached end to end, the rails in the area in question 
being 39 feet in length. At the joint the attachment 
is made by the use of t'vo angle bars, one on each 
side of the rail, through 'vhich are t"To holes on either 
side of the joint, with bolts and tightening nuts. An 
open joint such as the one in question is caused by 
the contracting of the rails in extre1nely cold \Yeather 
to the point 'vhere t'vo bolts on one side of the joint 
are sheared, thus causing the rails to be ~Pparated so1ne 
distance. ( R 96-99) The rails of the open joint in ques-
tion "rere a ppToxiina tely one and three quarters of an 
inch apart. (R-99) 
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'1_1hp \York involved in repairing an open joint con-
~i~t~ in loosening the nuts on the bolts at each joint, 
continuing fron1 tlLP open joint for approxiinately nine 
joint~ in Paeh di reetion. After the nuts are loo~ened, a 
(•lti~el i~ used to pr~· at tlH) particular joint in order to 
pu~h the rail~ at the open joint close enough together 
~o that. TIP\\. bolts and nuts can be used at the phH'P " ... here 
they have been broken. (R. 105-108) For the purpose of 
loosening the nut~, a "'rench approxin1ately -! feet in 
length is u~Pd. T·he head end of the bolt fits snugly into 
a re~e~~ed part of thP angle iron and therefore the nuts 
ean be tightened or loosened by using the wrench. 
The ere"\\: Inet at the toolhouse "·est of the depot in 
Green River at approximately 5:00 P.ni. At that ti1ne 
the \veather \vas described as "awful cold," (R. 94) the 
\veather report sho"\\7 ing a te1nperature of 10° F. (Ex-
hibit 3-P) The plaintiff ,~lore what he thought to be 
adequately "·a.rn1 clothing, consisting of heavy under-
""ear, a levi-type of ""aist overalls, heavy shirt, and 
heavy jacket, sheepskin coat, heavy socks, \vork shoes, 
and t\YO pair of gloves, an inner glove described as 
canvas gloves, \Yith a flannel material on the inside, 
and an outer glove described as rubberized canvas. (R 
9-±, 95) Plaintiff .had dressed sin1ilarly to this on the 
joh on prior occasions. (R 94, 154) Plaintiff was not 
"rearing overshoes. ( R 9-t, 95) 
The ere"· was taken in a truck to :Jiilepost 571, 
\\·here it " ... as 1net by the signal 1naintainer, Bud ''T ernz. 
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vV ernz took the cre\v \vith hiu1 on a motorcar to ~ho'v 
them the open joint approxirnately % of a 1nile a\\·ay. 
As soon as the crew was s.hown the open joint in que~­
tion, they inserted a "Dutchman," so that the track 
could be used and gone over by trains while the work 
was going on. A "Dutchman" is a good temporary 
n1easure that is used for this purpose. (R 101, 118) It 
eonsists of a small piece of rail, the pieces having 
been p·recut in various sizes. The angle bars are taken 
off, the "Dutchman" inserted, and then the angle bars 
replaced, tightening the nuts on the bolts on one side 
of the joint. With the "Dutchman'' so inserted, trains 
can be slo,ved down and taken across the joint being 
repaired. 
Plaintiff testified that a ~'Dutchman" is a safe 
temporary measure and could have been used as it was 
on the night in question, with merely one man at the 
site so that the crew could have been brought out during 
daylight the next morning to complete the job in 4 
hours instead of the 10 to 12 hours that it took on the 
night in (1uestion. (R 119, 120) There "~as evidence 
that it 'vas practical to issue a train order so that 
trains con1ing over "rould' know \Yhere to slo\v down. 
(R 1:21) Plaintiff also testified that by utilizing an 
extra cre\v the time could be cut do\\11 from -± hours 
to :2 hours to do the job; and that an extra erew work-
ing at night in conjunction \vith the crew on which he 
\vas \vorking, could have done the job in-! hours. (R 1:20, 
121) 
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..:\s soon as the '" Dutclnnan'' \Vas inserted, plaintiff 
\\'a:-; sent back to the truck, \\·hich was left near l\Iilepost 
rl71, the truckdriver having gone back prior to that \\"ith 
the signal 1naintainer on his motorcar. The plaintiff 
had to walk back through 8 to 10 inches of sno\\\ 
approxi1nately 300 yards to the high\vay to n1e-et the 
truck. ( 1{ 102) In the back of the truck t~he cre\Y had 
brought a railroad tie \\·hich ".,.as used as soon as the 
truc.k arrived to build a fire. A fire \\·as built and 
used but did not produce 1nuch heat, for the reason 
that the \\"ind \\·as blo,ving fro1n the \\·est through the 
cut in "·hieh the open joint \vas located. (R 105) 
11he "\vork was done by ~ or 3 men \vorking at a 
joint one holding the lamp and another using the wrench 
to loosen tJ1e nuts, and the foreman supervising. ( R 106-
110) Plaintiff testified that it V."as cold; that using hi:-; 
hands on the cold tools also contributed to the coldness 
of his hands; that the \vork continued with occasionally 
a man's being able to go back to the fire to attempt 
to keep ,,·arm, and occasionaly \vhen a train would co1ne 
by, the entire cre\\T \vould be back at the fire. Plaintiff 
testified that later on another fire \\"as built. (R 110) 
Plaintiff testified that at approximately midnight he 
noticed that he had to pry his fingers on the left hand 
fron1 their grip on the wrench and commented about 
this to the foreman (R 109); that they continued their 
\Vork; that later on the battery on the light grew weak; 
and that the lights on the truck 'vere used to help light 
the area. Plaintiff testified that he \\'"as in the truck 
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at the end of the shift for not more than a half hour. 
(R 143, 1-1:4) The job was finished at approximately 
4- :00 A.~{., and the crew "\Vas taken back to Green River, 
arriving at approximately 5:00 A.M. (R 111) During 
the time the crew was on the job there were approx-
imately three trains, two passenger and one freight, 
which came across the joint. (R 146, 1-1:7) At the time 
that plaintiff first noticed his fingers having to be 
pried from the tool, he noticed a tingling ·sensation; 
and later, after arriving home that morning, the tingling, 
burning, and discoloration. He went to see the doctor 
that same morning after sleeping and received some 
Inedication. Later he was sent to Dr. Hubbard in Price 
and was hospitalized. Eventually his little finger "\vas 
re1noved at approximately the first joint from the 
knuckle and the ring finger, right at the knuckle. (R 111-
11-l:) 
In 1938 plaintiff had lost the middle finger of the 
left hand due to infection. (R 115) Plaintiff testified 
that during the years fron1 1938 to 1960 he had been 
able to successfully perfor1n his \York as a section 
laborer; that he could get a satisfactory grip on his 
tools; but that since losing the other t\YO fingers fro1n 
the incident in question, he had difficulty grasping tools 
and particularly in using tie tongs and a 'vheelharro\v. 
Plaintiff returned to \York on July 15, 1960, \Yith lost 
\\·ages of approxi1nately $2,132.00. (R 118) 
Dr. Reed Clegg testified that as a result of the loss 
of the t\\To fingers the plaintiff is suffering from a 
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disability of the hand function 25 per cent greater than 
the prior existing disability. (159, 163) He also testified 
that with body temperature being reduced, a person'~ 
extremities are more easily subject to frostbite; and 
therefore a person having cold feet is more easily sub-
jected to frostbite in his fingers and hands. (R 165) 
The fore1nan, ,J. G. Chronopolous, testified he noticed 
"~hen the cre\Y first met at 5:00 P.~f. that Dennis did 
not have over~hoes on and that he did not think he 
'va~ \\"armJ~~ enough dressed. He did nothing about it. 
(R 196) 
The jury returned a verdict in the gross arnount of 
$20,000.00 and reduced it by $10,000.00 for contributory 
negligence on the part of plaintiff, leaving a net verdict 
of $10,000.00. Defendant made a motion for judgment 
not\\·ithstanding the verdict and a motion for a ne"\v 
trial. (R 73-75) Defendant made no complaint in either 
of said 1notions concerning the amount of damages 
a"·arded by· the jury. 
ARGU~1ENT 
POINT I 
THIS IS A PROPER CASE FOR THE JURY 
ROGERS 
~ince the la\Y involved is Federal, the opinions of 
the l.,.nited States Supreme Court are controlling. Prior 
to 1957 the Supre1ne Court zealously guarded the right 
to a jury trial. See wnke1·son r. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 
5~, 69 S.Ct. -!-13, -t-18, 93 L.Ed. -±97; Lavender v. Ktttru, 
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327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916; Ellis t:. Union 
Pacific RR. Co., 148 Neb. 515, 27 N.W. 2d 921, 329 lT.S. 
649, 67 S.Ct. 598, 91 I..~.E~d. 572; Lillie v. Thrnnpson 
( 194 7), 332 U.S. 459, 68 S. Ct. 140, 92 L. Ed. 73. In 1957 
the United States Supreme Court handed down opinions 
in three FELA cases which set the course for the future~ 
The Court in these cases set a sharp trend toward even 
greater liberality in guarding the right of a jury trial 
for claimants under FJ~JLA. Since then the Court has 
guarded this right by granting petitions for certiorari 
and reversing cases "\vhere a jury trial has been denied. 
The 1957 cases are: Rogers v. Misso1tri Pacific RR. 
()o., 352 lT.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed. 2d 493, TVebb 
v. Illinois Central RR. Co., 352 U.S. 512, 77 S.Ct. 451, 
1 L.Ed. 2d 503; and Jlerguson v. Moore-McCormack 
LiHes, I uc., 352 lT.S. 5~1~ 77 S.Ct. 457, 459 L.Ed. 2d 511. 
In the Rogers case the plaintiff had been given 
the task of burning off ''reeds and vegetation near 
defendant's tracks. ln addition, he "'as given the duty 
of watching for hot boxes on passing trains. ,, ... hile 
perforining the burning \York, he \Yas \Yatching for hot 
boxes on a passing train, \\~hen it fanned the flames, 
causing hin1 to beeon1e suddenl~T enveloped in flames 
and ~nnoke, to retreat and fall fron1 the top of a culvert. 
J udgn1ent on a jury verdiet \Yas revPrsed by the l\lissouri 
Hupren1e Court for the rPason that petitioner's O"\\rn 
conduct \\'as the sole proxin1ate eau~e of the 1nishap. 
The eourt reversP<t holding that a jur~T question \Yas 
prPsented b~· the evidence. J u~tice Brennan stated at 
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page 44S: 
'•lTnder this statute the test of a jury case 
is simply whether the proofs justify with reason 
the conelusion that employer negligence played 
any part, even the slighte,-.d, in pToducing the in-
jur~T or death for \vhich da1nages are sought. It 
does not 1natter that, fron1 the evidence, the jury 
1nay also "Tith reason, on grounds of probability, 
attribute the result to otht·r causes, including the 
en1ployee 's contributory negligence. Judicial ap ... 
praisal of the proofs to determine "Thether a jury 
question is presented is narro\Yly limited to the 
single inquiry \Yhether, with reason, the conclusion 
1nay he dra\\Tn that negligence of the employer 
played any part at all in the injury or death. 
Judges are to fix their sights primarily to n1ake 
that appraisal and, if that test is met, are bound 
to find that a case for the jury is made out 
\\Thether or not the evidence allo\vs the jury a 
choice of other probabilities. 'The statute express-
}~~ imposes liability upon the employer to pay 
damages for injury or death due ' in whole or in 
part' to its negligence . . . The burden of the 
employee is met, and the obligation of the enl-
ployer to pay damages arises, when there is p,roof, 
even though entirely circumstantial, from \Vhich 
the jury may with reason make that inference. 
~'The Congress \vhen adopting the law was 
particularly concerned that the issues whether 
there \vas employer fault and \vhether that fault 
played any part in the injury or death of the em-
ployee should be decided by the jury whenever 
fair-minded men could reach these conclusions 
on the evidence . . . 
•' Cognizant of the duty to effectuate the in-
tention of the C'ongress to secure the right to a 
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jury determination, this Court is vigilant to ex-
ercise its po,ver of revie'v in any case 'vhere it 
appears that the litigants have been improperly 
deprived of that deter1nination ... 
"The kind of misconception evidenced in the 
opinion belo,v, 'vhich fails to take into account the 
special features of this statutory negligence action 
that make it significantly different from the ordi-
nary common-law negligence action, has required 
this Court to revie\v a nun1ber of cases. In a rela-
tively large percentage of the ca~es revie\\~ed, the 
Court has found that lo\ver courts have not given 
proper scope to this integral part of the Congre~­
sional scheme. We reach the sa1ne conclusion in 
this case. The decisions of this Court after the 
1939 amendments teach that the ·Congress vested 
the power of decision in these actions exclusively 
in the jury in all but the infrequent cases \\~here 
fair-minded jurors cannot honestly differ 'vhether 
fault of the employer played any part in the em-
ployee's injury. Special and important reasons 
for the grant of certiorari in these cases are cer-
tainly present \vhen lo,ver federal and state courts 
persistently deprive litigants of their right to a 
jury determination." 
The Webb case involved injuries received by plain-
tiff in a fall on a cinder roadbed, 15 feet fro1n the house-
track s "~itch. He \\ras alongside the track co1mecting to 
the s\\·iteh and ~lipped on an unnoticed, partially covered 
cinder H about the ~ize of his fist," e1nbed'ded in the level 
but soft roadb(~d. It \Ya~ conceded that the clinker in the 
roadbed creatPd a hazardous condition, giving rise to de-
fendant's liabilit~~ under the act if the proof raised a jury 
qne~tion of defendant'~ alleged negligence in permitting 
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tlH· <·linker to be there. The l~ourt of Appeals vie\ved 
t hP evidence as insufficient to raise a jury question be-
enusp the petitionpr did not adduce proof sho\\~ing \\'hat 
standard procedures \\'ere follo,ved to prevent large clink-
ers fron1 being used in road ballast, and in inspPct ing 
roadhPds for hazards to finn footing. The Supreine 
Court reversed, holding that there \vas a jury question 
raised h~T the evidence. 
The Ferguson case \\Tas a suit under the Jones .. Aet 
"Thich applies FELA la\v. The suit \vas for injuries sus-
tained h~T a ship's baker "~hen his hand slipped onto the 
blade of a sharp butcherlmife "Thich he \\"as using to chip 
hard ieP crean1. The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reveT~Pd judg1nent for plaintiff, holding that de-
fendant's n1otion for a directed verdict should have been 
granted. The Supre1ne (~ourt granted certiorari and re-
versed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the opin-
ion b:T ~lr. Justice Douglas. 
Plaintiff at the time of his injury was a second 
baker on respondent's passenger ship Brazil. At the tin1e 
in question he \Yas filling an order for 12 portions of ice 
crean1. \\Then he got half\\~ay do\Yn into a 2%-gallon ice 
crea1n container, he found that the ice cream \vas so hard 
that it could not be removed with the hemispherical scoov 
\\Thich he had been furnished. He then undertook to re-
lnove the ice cream \Yith a sharp butcherknife kept near-
by, grasping the handle and chipping at the ·hard ice 
erea1n. The knife struck a spot in the ice crea1n \\~hieh 
\\?a:-: so hard that his hand slipped do\"\"'11 onto the blade of 
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the knife, resulting in the loss of two fingers of his right 
hand. The jury returned a verdict of $17,500.00. The 
Court of Appeals, in reversing, held it was not ''Tithin 
the realm of reasonable foreseeability that plaintiff 'vould 
use the knife to chip the frozen ice cream. 'The Supreme 
Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to take 
to the jury the question of whether respondent "\Vas negli-
gent in failing to furnish petitioner "\vith an adequate 
tool with ":hich to perform his task. Petitioner had testi-
fied that the hard ice cream could have been loosened 
safely with an ice chipper 'vhich he had used on other 
ship~s. He was not, however, furnished 'vith such an 
instrument. The court stated on page 458: 
"On this record, fair-minded men could con-
clude that respondent should have foreseen that 
petitioner might be tempted to use a knife to per-
form his task "\vith dispatch, since no adequate 
implement was furnished him. . . . Since the 
standard of liability under the Jones Act is that 
established by Congress under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, -±5 U.S.C.A. ·§51, et seq., 
'vhat "Te said in Rogers v. llfissouri Pacific RR 
Co., 352 lT.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, is relevant here ... '' 
A reading of the foregoing three cases 'vill show 
conclusively that the U. S. Supre1ne Court "ill guard 
the right of a jury trial in FELA cases, fir1nly believing 
that to deprive railroad workers of the benefit of a jury 
trial in close or doubtful eases is to take a"\vay a goodly 
portion of thPir r<'lief "\vhich Congress has afforded them . 
.:\1()1~1~~ (i(){:I.JD H.A. '?E BEEN DONE RULE 
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One of the rules \rhiclt haH been adopted to assist in 
deter1nining \\·hether or not tl:ere is a ,jury q~iestion is the 
rnle that, if n1nre could haec been done for the p1aintiff's 
~afety, there is a jury question. 'l,his rule "·as establisehd 
in the case of Bailey r. ( 1entral T'"erulont Raillcay. luc., 
(19-!3) 319 {T.S. 350, 63 S. l 1t. 1062, 87 L.Ed. 1~~~- This 
\Yas a death action under FELA, the decedent having 
been killed b~· a fall fro1n a bridge over a cattlepass, the 
railroad tracks being about lt) feet above the ground. At 
the tune in question, decedent \Vas working on a ere,,· 
engaged in dun1ping cinders through the ties in the bridge 
floor onto the road\vay belo"\\r. The only available footing 
at the side of the car \vas about 1:2 inches \vide, of \vhich 
8 or 9 inches \Yere taken up by a raised stringer.. There 
\\~as no guardrail. The evidence showed that the cinders 
\Yere in a hopper ~ar; that the doors in the floor could 
be opened hy turning a nut at the side of the car in a 
tightening manner until a dog was disengaged by an-
other employee, at ,,·hich time the nut \vould spin, due to 
the weight of the cinders on the doors. There \Yas evidence 
that the deceased \\Tas unskilled and perhaps unfanliliar 
w·ith the opening of hopper cars, no one having seen 
him do this type of work before. It was also e,vident that 
the hopper car could have been opened before it "\\.,.as 
1noved onto t.he bridge, and any cinders \vhich spilled on 
the road\\·a:· shoveled off onto the roadway beneath the 
bridge; or, after the cinders had been dumped upon the 
roadbed, a railroad tie could have been utilized as a drag 
to push cinders from the roadbed to the ground belo\\.,. the 
bridge. The Supreme Court of ,~ermont reversed judg-
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n1ent for plaintiff, .holding that defendant's n1otion for 
a directed verdict should have been granted, for the 
reason that negligence \vas not shown. The li. S. Supreme 
Court, in an opinion by ::\[r. J us6ce Douglas, rever~ed the 
Supre1ne Court of 'T ermont, holding that a jury question 
was created hy the evidence. The court stated at page 
1064: 
''The nature of the task "yhich Bailey tmder-
took, the hazards which it entailed, the effort 
which it required, the kind of footing he had, the 
space in ":rhich he could stand, the absence of a 
guard rail, the height of the bridge above the 
ground, the fact that the car could have been open-
ed or unloaded near the bridge on level ground-
all these were facts and circumstances for the jury 
to \veigh and appraise in determining \vhether 
respondent in furnishing Bailey \\ith that par-
ticular place in which to pe:rform the task \vas 
negligent. The debatable quality of that issue, 
the fact that fair-minded men might reach dif-
ferent conclusions, emphasize the appropriateness 
of leaving the question to the jury. The jury is 
the tribunal under our legal system to decide that 
type of i~sue. (Tiller Y. Atlantic Coast Line R. 
Co., ~upra) . . . To deprive these " .. orkers of the 
benefit of a jury trial in close or doubtful cases 
is to take a\\ya~: a goodly portion of the relief 
\\'"hirh Congres~ has afforded them." 
The above cas(l, in addition to setting forth the "more 
could ,have been <lone" rule, instructs us that in determin-
ing \vhether or not the railroad has failed in its duty 
to furni~h the plaintiff "yith a reasonably safe place to 
\\'"Ork, all of the ele1nent~ of the task should be considered 
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and presented so that the jury can look at the job as a 
'vhole to find out \vhether or not defendants had failed. 
Follo\ving the Bailey case, the First Circuit applied 
the reasoning BailP~~ in Boston & Maine RR v. BI eech, 
( 19-Hi) 156 F .2d 109; certiorari denied October 28, 1946, 
G7 ~. Ct. 124, 329 lJ.~. 763, 91 L.Ed. 658. The question 
presented in this case \Vas whether or not there was 
evidence sufficient to support the verdict for plain6ff 
in a death action ..... t\..t the time of the accident in question, 
plaintiff "ras engaged in the work of stripping incoming 
loco1notives. This 'vork consisted of removing ladders, 
oilers, and s1nall tools from locomotives as they ca1ne in 
off the road. It was done on a platform kno"\\rn as a 
\\~ashstand, \\rhich consisted of two parallel wooden plat-
forms about 100 feet long, 6 feet wide, and 5 or 6 inches 
above ground level on either side of the track. The evi-
dence showed that there was an overhang on loco-
motives of 15 inches. Decedent was on the washstand on 
the side opposite to the engineer when a backing engine 
hit hi1n and caused his death. The Circuit ·Court held 
that there was n1ore than a scintilla of evidence to sup-
port the verdict, either on negligent operation of the loco-
lnotive or failure to p-rovide decedent with a reasonably 
safe place to 'york. As to the second count of negligence 
the court stated at page 111: 
'"The defendant might have painted lines on 
the platform of its \Y'ashstand to indicate the 
extent to \vhich locomotives overhang them, and 
thus to warn persons on the platforms of the 
danger incident to standing near their inner 
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borders or it might even have set the platforms 
of its washstand back from the tracks far enough 
to prevent locomotives frorn overhanging them 
at all. 
"From the foregoing, it is clear that although 
some precautions were taken for the decedent's 
safety, ftttrther precaution.s trere possible, and 
fro1n this it follows, as 've read the decisions cited 
above, that there was an 'evidentiary basis' for 
submitting the issue of the defendant's causal 
negligence to the jury, and hence our 'function 
is exhausted.' " 
Another Supreme Court case which follo,ved in the 
philosophy and fonn of Bailey was Blair v. Baltimore 
& Oh,io RR Co. (1945), 323 U.S. 600, 65 S. Ct. 545, 546~ 
89 L.Ed. -t90. In that case, while three 'vorkmen were 
attempting to 1nove a heavy steel pipe 'vith the aid of a 
s1nall truck 2 feet high, the pipe slipped and t'Yo of the 
workn1en released their holds, but petitioner did not. 
The heavy· tube in ~lipping caused the truck to kick back, 
resulting in petitioner'~ injury. The Supreme Court of 
Penns:Tlvania rever~ed the judgment for p-etitioner, hold-
ing petitionel' had a~~tnned the risk, and there was no 
negligence on the part of tliP defend·ant. On review, the 
Supren1P Court rever~Pd, ~tating runong other things: 
H \ V e think there is sufficient evidence to 
sub1ni t to the jury the question of negligence 
posed by thP co1nplaint. The duty of the en1ployer 
heeon1es '1norP in1perative' as the risk increases. 
. . . The negligence of the en1ployer may be de-
ternl inPd b:T vie\\·ing its co uduct as a u·hole. . . 
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and especially is this true in a case such as this, 
'vhere the several ele1nents from which negligenct~ 
might be inferred are so closely inter\\'"OVen as 
to fonn a single pattern, and where each imparts 
character to the others. 
'~rrhe nature of the duty \\'"hich the petitioner 
\Va~ conunanded to undertake, the dangers of mov-
ing a greasPd, 1000 lb. ste·el tube, 30 feet in length, 
on a ;) foot truck, the area over which that truck 
\\~as con1pelled to be Inoved, the suitableness of 
the tools used in an extraordinary 1nanner to ac-
coinplish a novel purpose, the number of men 
assigned to assist him, their experience in such 
\York and thPir ability to perform the duties and 
the manner in \vhich they performed those duties 
-all of those raised questions appropriate for a 
jury to appraiS'e in considering ''"hether or not the 
injury \\ras the result of negligence as alleged in 
the co1nplaint. We cannot say as a matter of la\\'" 
that the railroad complied with its duties in a 
reasonably careful manner under the circum-
stances here, nor that the conduct which the jury 
might have found to be negligent did not contri-
bute to the petitioner's injury 'in whole or in part.' 
(~onsequently \Ye think the jury, and not the court 
~ hould finally determine these issues." 
It i~ submitted that the foregoing cases coming be-
fore Rogers, together 'vith the Rogers case, and its conl-
panion case~, sho"'" that the Supreme Court has coin-
manded that in such a case as tl1e case at bar, the entire 
conduct of the railroad as a 'vhole should be considered 
and presented to the jury; such as, the nature of the task 
and ho'v it \\'"as performed, and coupled with this, \vhether 
or not 1nore could have been done by the railroad to pro-
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teet its e1nployees. Pursuant to Rogers, if these ('Oll-
siderations "justify \vith reason the conclusion that enl-
ployer negligence played any part, even the sli.rJhtest, in 
producing the injury," then a jury question is Inade out. 
PO·ST ROGERS 
Since Rogers, tlhe Supreme Court has, in nunterous 
cases, granted certiorari and reversed \Yhere a jury 
detern1ination has been denied. Also, lower courts 
have follo\ved the mandate of Rogers. The follo\Ying are 
examples of the militant attitude on the part of the 
Supreme Court and other courts since Rogers in guard-
ing this right to a jury trial. 
Strickland v. Seaboard Air Line RR Co., (Fla.), 80 
So.2d 914, 350 U.S. 893, 76 S. Ct. 157, 100 L.Ed. 786. 
Plaintiff received injury while engaged in operation of 
changing outside brakebeam weighing 118 pounds, assist-
ed by three men on the outside of the car; necessary for 
one man to be in a sitting or squatting p·osition under-
neath to disengage beam from belts; \Yhile plaintiff 
doing this, slipped and fell hack against a s\vitchbox. 
J£vidence "Tas produced that a pit could have been used 
in \vhieh plaintiff rould have assumed a standing posi-
tion and had a helper. There \Yas evidence that this \Yas 
safer and easiPr~ although \Yitnesses did not state that it 
\Vas unsafe to ehange the bean1 on a flat track. Also, there 
\Vas evidence that it "~as cu~ton1ary to change the beam on 
a flat track~ and defendant rould not get trains out on 
tin1e if it had to use the pits. The lo\\Ter court held that 
the evid<'n<·<~ \\·as insnffirient for a jury Yerdict, \Yhieh 
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'vould have the effect of requiring the defendant to 
change its operational polic~~ as to this operation, espe-
cially 'vhen plaintiff is seeking to hold defendant liable 
for a cn8to1nary practice, of "·hieh neither he nor other 
'vork1nen had ever contplained to defendant's officers. 
On appeal the Supreme Court of the U.S. granted certio-
rari and reversed judgment, citing the Bailey case. 
Daris v. Virgin~an Railway Co. (1960), 361 U.S. 35-1-, 
80 S.Ct. 387, 4 L.Ed. 2d 366. Action for personal injuries 
un<ler FELA, sustained by yard conductor who was 
spotting various railway cars to loading platform on sp·ur 
track of industrial plant and who had taken his position 
on top of ears in order to assist the brakeman, and who 
slipped "rhile descending ladder of boxcar. Trial judge 
sustained n1otion for defendant to strike the, plaintiff's 
evidence and discharge the jury. Virginia Sup·reme Court 
affirmed. Plaintiff's first cause of action charged rail-
road with negligence in requiring the shifting of the cars 
in such accelerated time and with such inexperienced' help 
that petitioner was injured in attempting to carry out his 
instructions. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and reversed, holding that the issue of negligence should 
have been submitted to the jury. The evidence showed 
that there were some 22 loaded cars to be spotted; that 
2 brakemen were assigned to assist plaintiff; and that the 
spotting was to be done during the lunch period at the 
plant, which was 30 minutes. The evidence showed that 
neither of the brakemen assigned to petitioner was ex-
perienced in that particular operation. There was evi-
dence to the effect that the Ininimum time for completion 
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of such operation was 50 minutes, and the 1naxi1nnln ""ell 
over an hour; that on account of the above facts, it "~as 
necessary for the plaintiff to work faster than normally; 
and because of the inexperience of the brakemen, he had 
to take a p·osition on top of the boxcars to be ready to 
assist the brakemen; and that his norn1al position \Yould 
have been on the ground. It \Vas stated by the court at 
page 389: 
'"We think it should have been left to the 
jury to decide whether the respondent's direction 
to complete the spotting operation within 30 
minutes, plus the inexperience of the braken1en 
assigned to perform this 'hot job,' Inight have 
precipitated petitioner's injury. 'The debatable 
quality' of that issue, the fact that fair-minded 
men might reach different conclllSions, emphasize 
the appropriateness of leaving the question to the 
jury.' (citing Bailey)" 
Fitzpatrick 1:. St. I.~ouis S. F. Ry. Co. (~Io.) 3:27 S.\\~. 
2d 801. Suit for loss of an eye by braken1an, who had 
duty of assisting conductor in "Tatehing for train order 
signals and messages and on curves for hotboxes~ drag-
ging brakes, etr. Plaintiff testifie.d that on August 17, 
195-1-, he stuck his head out to look for a signal and got 
a s"Ti rl of dust in his eye; and on the san1e run, "Thile 
observing another signal, received another S\\irl of dust. 
There \vas m·edical evidence that. this could ha Ye ~a used 
the corneal ulcer which resulted in the loss of his eye. 
The Supreine Court of l\Iissouri held that the e'Tidence 
presented a jury question as to negligenee in not fur-
nishing goggles under the hazardous conditions of dust .. 
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even though plaintiff testified that he had never worn 
gogglPs and had never seen brakemen or conductors 
"tearing them. 
R.ingheiser v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 354 U.S. 901, 
77 S. ( 1t. 1093, 1 L.Ed. 1268. Action by engineer for in-
juries ~ustained when he \Yent to a gondola car to answer 
a call of nature, and the car \vas struck by another car 
during switching operations, causing steel plates \Yith 
"'"hich the gondola car was loaded to shift and crush the 
engineer's leg. The lT.S. District Court of Ohio sustained 
the railroad's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict in favor of t·he engineer. The Court of Appeals af-
firined the judgment. The U.S. Supreme ·C~urt reversed' 
the judgment of the lower courts, holding that whether 
the railroad \vas or should have been aware of conditions 
\v:hich ereated a likelihood that the engineer would' suffer 
just such injury as he did \Vas a question for the jury. 
Conner z:. Ru tle r, 361 1J.S. 29, 80 S. Ct. 21, -± L.Ed. 2d 
10. Personal injnr~T action under FELA brought by 
a hosecutter who \\'"a~ injured \Yhen the raised platform 
floor or trapdoor in a passenger car fell on his hand as 
he was inspecting the car prior to use. The District Court 
of Appeals of Florida. rrhird District, sustained disiniss-
al. The Supre1ne ( 1ourt of Florida affirmed without op-
inion, the Florida _A .. ppellate eourt opinion being at 109 
So. 2d 183; the Supre1ne (iourt action being at 113 So. 
2d 835. The lJ.S. Supre1ne Court in a per euriam opinion 
granted certiorari and reversed, citing the Rogers case. 
Plaintiff did not show the latch holding the raised plat-
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form floor to be defective, and he did not kno\\'" ho'v or 
why the floor injured him. 
Harris v. Pennsylvania RR Co., 361 U.S. 15, 80S. Ct. 
22, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1. Action under FELA for injuries sus-
tained by member of a ~',vreck train cre\v" 'vhen he slip-
ped \vhile aiding in ret racking derailed cars. It 'vas held 
that the evidence sustained a jury finding that the rail-
road ,,·as negligent in failing to use reasonable care to 
provide the employee with a safe place to \vork, in that 
he was required to 'vork on a crosstie which 'vas elevated 
a substantial distance above the ground level and \vhich 
\vas covered \vith grease or oil, affording an unstable 
footing, and that the railroad's n·egligenee played a part 
in producing the employee's injury. The only evidence 
that there 'vas grease on the crosstie \\"'"as petitioner's 
statement on cross exru11ination that he found son1e 
grease on the sole of the shoe of his right foot, and the 
testimony of the section foreman of the other railroad 
that grease \vas used on that railroad's s\vitches, "~hich 
\YPrP customarily lubricated at least t\\·ice a 'veek. 
lJunn 'r. Co1zenraugh & Black I.~ick RR. CC _A __ :2d 1959~ 
267 F.2d 571. Action by a traclrn1an to recover for in-
juries sustained as a result of allegedl~· being required 
to engage in heav~· physical labor too soon after surgery. 
J udg1nent for the plaintiff \\·as appealed to the Circuit 
(;ourt \vhich held that the evidence justified a finding 
that defendant's negligence played a part in producing 
the injuries for \\·hich da1na.g0~ 'vere a\varded to plain-
tiff. I 'rior to January, 1D:l:2, plaintiff had been en1ployed 
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as a 1ne1nber of a H(~asey Jones crew" \vhieh carried 
supplies to and from track repair gangs. This job in-
volved lifting extrernely heavy rail~, \Yeighing at times 
as mneh as a thousand pounds. In January, 1~)5~, plain-
tiff, then 36 years old, underwent an operation for chronic 
ulcer~, requiring a gastric resection of % of his stomach. 
T·he railroad doetor released the plaintiff for duty some 
7 ".,.eeks after the operation. There \\'"as evidence tending 
to sho\v that the heavy work plaintiff was required to per-
forin thereafter caused a ventral hernia. The Circuit 
Court stated at page 575 : 
"There \vas sufficient evidence adduced to 
1nake it a jury question as to whether plaintiff had 
been forced b~y defendant into work for which he 
\vas unfitted by reason of his physical condition at 
the time. J t 1 s settled that where '. . . manage-
ment forced a sick employee, of \Vhose illness they 
knew or should have kno,vn, into work for which 
he \\ras unfitted because of his condition, a case 
is 1nade out for the jury under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability .... t\..ct.' Nuttall v. Reading Co., 
3 Cir. 1956, 235 F .~d 5+fi. 5-+9." 
Bottrquet l\ .L4tchison, 11.&S.F. Ry. Co. (N.M. 1959), 
65 N.ni. 207, 3::3+ P.2d 1112. In this case the plaintiff suf-
fered a hernia \\'"hile trying to pull in the side of a steel 
coal car hy usP of a turnbuckle. Plaintiff and one other 
man \\·er() assigned to this job; the other man had to stay 
outside to use a burner to heat the side. There was testi-
mony that 1t \\yas dangerous for only one 1nan to use the 
turnbuckle; that this \Ya~ a 3-n1an job. There \vas also 
evidence that the plaintiff had not requested additional 
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ihelp, and evidence that the turnbuckle was rusty and 
harder to use for tltat reason. The Supreme Court of 
N e'v Mexico held that the evidence pre~sented a jury ques-
tion as to negligence in failing to furnish adequate tools 
or adequate assistance. ·The court cited the case of 
Southern Ry. Co. v. Welch, 6th Cir. 1957, 247 P.2d 340, 
as being a case \vith sirnilar facts, \vhere the plaintiff'~ 
\York \va~ to srnooth off sharp burrs from the end of 
reclairned rails by grinding them with an emery \vheel; 
that 200 rails were ground in one day, each weighing ap-
proximately 1600 pounds. Plaintiff was compelled to pull 
the rails partly cross\vise of certain rollers supported by 
tables 3 feet high, upon which the rails were carried to 
be cut and ground. As a result of an injury to his back 
during the pulling operation, plaintiff suffered a rup-
tured disc bet,veen the 4th and 5th vertebrae. In regard 
to the issue as to \vhether or not defendant failed to 
furnish adequate assistance, the defendant claimed that 
this was a one-man job; but the court said that there \vas 
substantial evidence that upon the day of the injury, cir-
curnstances of p·articular difficulty existed; that the grit 
grirne, tar, and dirt on the rails \Vere excessive and re-
quired additional force to pull the rails into proper 
position; that under such circumstances, it had been the 
practice to assign an extra 1nan to assist on the job, and 
this \Yithout request. The court held that under this 
evidence, the findings of the District Court \vere clearly 
not e1rroneous and stated at page 341: 
"The en1ployer is under the nondelegable 
obligation of providing sufficient help for the 
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partieular task. Chesapeak & Ohio Railway Con~­
pauy v. Winder, 4 Cir. 23 F.2d 794. No duty re-
quired of the f!Hlployer for the safety and protec-
tion of his servants can be transferred so as to 
exonerate him from such liability. 1\Torthern Pa-
c£fic RR Co. v. ll erbert, 116 U. S. 64:2, G..t-7, 6 S:Ct. 
590, 29 L.Ed. 755. In this case the Supreme Court 
cited "~ith approval a decision of the ·Court of 
~\ppeals of New York, !/like v. Boston & Albany 
I~R Co., 53 N. Y. 5-t~J, \Yhich held the railroad 
liable for an accident caused hy an insufficient 
number of brakeman on the cars of the company 
... vVhether the emplo~:er has failed to perform 
his duty is a question of fact for the jury, ... " 
The New ~fexico court felt that the facts in the Bour-
guet case were stronger for the plaintiff than the vVelch 
case, and further relied heavily on the Blair case, supra, 
and especially as to the rule of the Blair case requiring 
the railroad conduct to be vie,ved as a wl1ole, considering 
all of the elements of the task in question. 
DU'TY TO SELECT AND INSTRUCT CREWS 
The Second Circuit case of Palum v. The Lehigh 
l"'alley RR Co., (19-±8) 165 F.2d 3, \vas a suit for personal 
injury under FELA which occurred while plaintiff was 
going over the coal car to c:heck a manhole for the amount 
of \\~ater in the tank. Plaintiff was hit when the train 
pa~sed under a lo\v bridge. On this particular run, plain-
tiff ,,·as part of a train crew on an inspection tour, and 
the train \\·a~ proceedjng over a track with \Vhich he was 
entirely unfarniliar, thi:-; being his first trip on said track . 
.. :\t a station \\,.here the unfamiliar track started, the en-
gineer and other cre\vinen had been changed for the 
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reason that they were unfamiliar with the track. The 
court held that there was sufficient evidence to support 
a jury verdict and stated at page 5 : 
''It is possible that in former times it \\"'"ould 
not have been regarded as negligent to embark 
firemen upon such a service as that to \vhich the 
plaintiff \Vas assigned but, under the recent rul-
ings of the Supreme Court, \Ye cannot say that it 
\Yas beyond reason for a jury to find that it \\'"as 
negligent to send the plaintiff on an unfamiliar 
route when firemen \vho were fan1iliar with that 
route could apparently have geen obtained \vith-
out great difficulty. It \vould certainly have been 
safer to send a firernan over the route " ... ho was 
familiar with it and there \vas evidence indicating 
that this safer method, if not invariably practiced, 
,, ... as generally employed. In such circumstances 
\Ve think it \\'"as required by the recent decisions 
of the Supreme Court to leave to the jury the 
question of whether that safer method should 
not have been chosen ... 
"The jury evidently thought that there ought 
to have been greater care exercised in selecting 
the cre\\ ... and that if Palum had not been sent over 
a route ".,.hen he \vas unfamiliar \Yith the dangers 
he might encounter he \vould not have be·en in-
jured. \\T e cannot say that such a Yie"... \Yas 
" ... ithout an~... substantial justification, and if not 
it " ... as beyond judicial control however doubtful 
rnigh t be its wisdom.'' 
In Cahi·ll v. New York, l\'eu· Haren, & Hartford RR 
Co., CCA2d 1955, 22+ F.2d 637~ 350 U.S. 898~ 76 S. Ct. 
180, 100 I.J. Ed. 790, the plaintiff \Yas injured "Thile flag-
ging do\vn tra.ffie \\.,.hich \\ ... as stopped behind a freight 
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train proceeding \\'e~t on a street. This \\~as the first ti1ne 
plaintiff had perfor1ned such duty, and he received no 
instructions other than to hold the truck which was stop-
ped behind the stovped train. vV.hen a trailer truck moved 
past the side of the car \vith close clearance, the plaintiff 
peeked around the side of the car to see whether the 
trailer \\'"ould clear. As he turned back to\vard the truck, 
it suddenly and without warning started up and struck 
hi1n, throwing him against the projecting coupling of the 
rear car. Plaintiff alleged failure to provide him with 
a reasonably safe place to work and failure to instruct 
and prepare him for the work assigned. The Circuit 
c·ourt held as a matter of law that the evidence was in-
sufficient to sustain a finding that the injury had been 
the result of the railroad's failure to properly instruct 
the brakeman or supervise his work, rather than neigli-
gence of the truck driver. Judge Frank dissented, for the 
reason that the jury could reasonably infer (1) that had 
the defendant prop~erly instructed plaintiff, he would 
have been so warned; and in the circumstances, he would 
not have peeked around at the moving trailer truck but 
would have remained face to face with the other truck; 
and (2) that had he done so, p~laintiff, an able-bodied 
1nan, aged 21, could and would have jumped out of harm's 
\vay. Judge Frank stated at page 640: 
"I assume, arguendo, that the inference 
needed to support the verdict would not suffice 
in a suit not brought under the Federal Em-
ployees' Liability Act. But the more recent 
Supre1ne Court decisions make it clear that, under 
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the Act, the jury's po,ver to dra'v inferences is 
greater than in common-law actions." 
Judge Frank also pointed out that his colleagues had 
overlooked recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions show-
ing a new attitude as of that time in FELA cases. The 
U.S. Supreme Court at 350 lT.S. 898, 76 S. Ct. 180, 
100 L. Ed. 790, on N overnber 21, 1955, in a p·er curian1 
decision, granted certiorari and reversed the judg1nent of 
the Second Circuit Court. 
FORESEEABILITY 
Defendant claims that the railroad should not have 
foreseen such type of harm to plaintiff even though it 
kept him in subfreezing temperatures for approxii11ateiy 
12 hours continuously. In regard to the concept of fore-
seeability as laid down by the Supreme Court, see Lill£e 
v. Thompson (1947), 332 U.S. 459, 68 S. Ct. 140, 92 L. 
Ed. 73, where plaintiff, a 22-year-old 'von1an "~as re-
quired to work as a telegraph operator in a one-roon1 
frame building in an isolated part of the yards of de-
fendant, frequented· by dangerous characters, her shift 
being from 11 :30 P.M. to 7 :30 A.~I. Plaintiff brought 
suit under FELA for damages resulting fro1n a criminal 
attack by an unknown assailant. The District Court 
granted summary judgment for defendant, and the Cir-
cuit Court affirmed. '11he lT.S. Supre1ne Court granted 
certiorari and reversed, stating at p. 142: 
HWe are of the opinion that the allegations 
in the corn plaint, if supported b~~ evidence, 'viii 
warrant sub1nission to a jury. Petitioner al-
leged in effect that re8pondent "~a8 a\\~are of 
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eon eli tions which created a likelihood that a young 
woman performing the duties required of peti-
tioner "'ould suffer just such an injury as \\Tas in 
fact inflicted upon her. That the foreseeable 
danger was from intentional or criminal miscon-
duct is irrelevant; respondent nevertheless had 
a duty to make reasonable provision against it. 
Breaeh of that duty would be negligence, and we 
cannot say as a matter of law that petitioner's 
injury did not result at least in part from such 
negligence.'' 
.t\_lso see Rivera v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (N.l\J. 
1956) 61 N.l\L 314, 299 P.2d 1090. Plaintiff, an extra 
gang laborer, furnished board and sleeping quarters on 
a \\Torktrain, attacked and injured by hoboes while visit-
ing outdoor toilet after working hours. I-Ield: Evidence 
warranted verdict for plaintiff on ground that railroad 
company was negligent in failing to furnish plaintiff 
a safe place to work. 
Also see t·he case of Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. 
Ry. Co. (1948), 333 lT.S. 821, 68 S.Ct. 854, 92 L.Ed. 1108, 
\\ ... here the Supreme 'Court of California had held that 
plaintiff would not have an actionable case unless he 
could show that the railroad company kne\v that decedent 
\Yas in a position \vhere he \vas unable to escape from the 
exposure to cold ".,.eather. Thi~ \\Tas the case where the 
conductor had disappeared fron1 the train and plaintiff 
had alleged that his death \\Tas due to failure on the part 
of the railroad company to promptly· and properly insti-
tute search. The U.S. Supreme C1ourt reversed, holding 
that a jury could have found that decedent's exposure 
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and deat'h were due 'in whole or in part' to failure of 
defendant to do V\rhat a reasonable and prudent man 
would ordinarily have done under the circumstances. 
SUM~IARY 
From the foregoing cases, it can be seen that the 
U.S. Supreme Court "\\rill grant certiorari and reverse 
any time a claimant offers proof "\Yhich justifies \\ith 
reason the conclusion that e1nployer negligence played 
any part, even the slightest, in producing his injury. 
'}}he cases sho,v that in deter1nining this question, the eon-
duct of the railroad as a "·hole "\Yill be vie,ved as to 
whether or not more could have been done to have pro-
vided plaintiff ,,·ith a safer place in "rhich to work, in-
cluding the way in "\vhich the task "\vas done, the adequacy 
of the help furnished, the tools furnished, etc. 
The evidence in this case sho,vs that the railroad 
required plaintiff to work in extremely cold "·eather 
for approximately 12 hours continuously, "ith only an 
inadequate fire for occasional 'varmth. There were ade-
quate means 'vith 'vhich defendant could have reduced 
the exposure by either furnishing a larger cre'v or using 
the '' Dutclnnan" a~ it \Ya~ used on the night in question, 
to postpone the job to daylight, at \vhich time it could 
have been done rnuch n1ore quickly and p,robably in "·arn1-
er weather. The evidence even sho\\·s that the foreman 
of the ere"·, \\·Pll lrnowing that plaintiff \\·as the only 
1nember of the cre'v "·ho did not have overshoe~, sent 
plaintiff through ~ to 10 inches of sno\\ ... for approxi-
Ina tely 300 yard:-; to get the truck: and this in vie"· of 
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testi1nony hy Dr. Clegg that lo\\·ering a 1nan 's foot tenl-
perature \vill 111ake hi1n rnore easily prone to frostbite 
of his fingers. 
It \\·ill be remembered that any complaint \vhich 
defendant n1akes as to plaintiff's own conduct in regard 
to his injuries has no 1nerit in this case, inasn1uch as the 
jury found that plaintiff was fifty per cent to blame and 
accordingly cut J1is verdict in half. The only question 
involved in this appeal is whether or not there is negli-
gence \\'"hieh the jury could have found on the part of de-
fendant ,,·hith played any part, even the slighte~t, in pro-
ducing plaintiff's injuries. Certainly, in the framework 
of the foregoing cases, there is no question about the 
correetne~s of submitting this case to the jury. 
POINT II 
INSTRUCTION 3 CONTAINS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR 
In defendant's Point II it first misstates that an 
identical instruction to Instruction No.3 was given in the 
case of J/ oore v. 1Jlle Denver & Rio Grande Western RR 
Co., -! U.2d 235, 292 P.2d 849, and then proceeds to argue 
against an instruction "chich \Vas not even given in the 
case at bar, to wit, the assumption of risk instruction. The 
instn1ction \Yhich was given in the nioore case is as fol-
lows: 
·'That at the tirne of the occurrence involved 
in this case, plaintiff, Alfred Roger nioore, and 
defendant \Vere mutually engaged in interstate 
commerce. 
"' 1J nder such circu1nstances the statutes of the 
states of Utah and Colorado covering employers' 
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liability and 'vorkmen's compensation are not 
applicable to this case and plaintiff's rig·ht to re-
cover, if any he has, is based solely on the statutes 
of the United States covering the liability of com-
mon carriers by railroad to their employees for 
injuries caused while in the course of their em-
ployment.'' 
Instruction No. 3 in the case at bar reads as follo"?s: 
HAt the time plaintiff alleges that he "Ta~ 
injured, the defendant 'vas engaged as a common 
carrier by railroad in interstate commerce and 
plaintiff was employed by said defendant in such 
interstate com1nerce, and plaintiff's injuries, if 
any you so find, "Tere incurred while plaintiff and 
defendant were mutually engaged in the conduct 
of such interstate commerce. 
'
4You are further instructed that under such 
c-ircumstances, plaintiff's sole and only right to 
recover, if any he has, is based on the statutes of 
the lTnited States covering the liability of eommon 
carriers by railroad to their employees for in-
juries caused 'vhile in the course of their en1ploy-
ment.'' 
There have been only t'Yo cases lmo"'ll to plaintiff 
which have discussed instructions even ren1otely similar 
to the one in question here, Bruner t~. i.llcCa'rthy. (1943) 
105 lT. 399, 142 P.2d 649, and the ~foore case, sup-ra. In 
discussing the instruction involved in the Bruner case~ 
Justice Wolff stated as follows at page 412: 
4 4 While Instruction 16, in which the jury 
was told that the plaintiff was engaged at the 
ti1ne of the accident in interstate commerce and 
that the case was therefore governed by Federal 
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rather than State la,v, may have been unneces-
sary in that the source of the law was not neces-
sarily a concern of the jury, it could in no way 
prejudice the defendants. The same is true of 
Instruction 17 in "\vhich the court admonished 
those jurors \\ .. ho have had previous trial exper-
ience in negligence cases to dispel from their 
minds any and all concceptions that they may have 
in respect to the law of negligence because this 
case was governed by Federal law rather than 
State law.'' 
This court in the Moore case discussed the instruc-
tion that was given in that ca8'e, which is different than 
the one in the case at bar on page 260 : 
·~ ..:\ ~iu1ilar instruction to this was discussed 
in the case of BrHner v. McCarthy, 105 U. 399, 
l-t2 l).:2d 649, the court stating that the source of 
the la\v \Vas not necessarily a concern of the jury. 
The Bruner case also discussed an instruction of 
the same iinport as Instruction 13 given in the 
present case ... " 
':J1he court then proceeded to discuss the instruction 
on assuntpt.ion of risk, citing the case of Ellis v. [Jnion 
Pacific R. Co., 148 Neb. 515, :27 ~.vV. 2d 921, 329 U.S. 649, 
67 S. Ct. 598, 91 L.Ed. 572, \vhich dealt exclusively ,, .. ith 
the assun1ption of risk instruction. The Court went on to 
hold that it \vas unnecessary to determine whether the 
giving of these instructions constituted reversible error, 
since the case \Va8 reversed on other grounds. Justice 
Crockett dissented in this aspect of the 1\Ioore case, his 
opinion dealing "Tith the que8tion of \vhether or not the 
t" .. o instructions constituted prejudicial error. l-Ie felt that 
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there was no prejudicial error in these instructions, and 
that they ,,,.ere certainly not idle dissertations on princi-
ples of law entirely foreign to the issues v.rhich were 
tried and that they correctly stated the basis of liability. 
In regard to Instruction No. 12, he stated at page 265: 
"No. 12 directs the jury not to consider the 
matter of Workmen's Compensation with 'vhich 
every person of common sense is nov.r acquainted, 
and \\""hich there may be reasonable apprehension 
that lay jurors' minds might consider. It should 
not be regarded as error that the trial court 
\Yarned them not to do so. 
''Courts habitually give cautionary instruc-
tions as v.ras done in this case. Instruction No. 20 
told the jury that the defendant was not an in-
surer of the safety of its employees. No such 
issue had been raised and it may be argued that 
the instruction was unnecessary. However, it is 
invariably requested by the defendant in such 
cases, and is usually given. It falls in the same 
category as the two instructions discussed in the 
main opinion. It does no harm as a precaution 
and does not misstate the law." 
Instruction No. 3 does not even state that \\T ork-
men 's Co1npensation la\\,.s do not apply, as "~as complain-
ed of in the l\Ioore case, but merely states that the source 
of the la\\c is the United States Statutes covering the 
liability of comn1on carriers by railroad; and that if 
plaintiff has a right to recover, his sole and only right 
is pursuant to these statutes. Certainly tlris instruction 
does no u1ore t;han to tell the jury to follow the eourt's 
instructions on the la\\T in this case and to discard any 
notions of their O\\·n, \\'"hich is customarilY done in every 
. . 
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ease. If there is any prejudice to the defendant by rea-
son of Instruction ~ o. :~, certainly" defendant should tell 
us what it is. DefPndant has not specified just how it 
was prejudiced b~r the giving of this instruction. De-
fendant has presented its entire argument as to how t;he 
ass1unption of risk instruction \vas prejudicial, and this 
illstruction u·a.s not even given in this case. Therefore, the 
authorities "Thich defendant cited-Sici:Z-iano v. The Den-
rer aud Rio Grande Wester·n Railroad Co., 12 U.2d 183, 
364 l>.2d -l-13, and the l~llis case, supra-are not in point, 
inasn1uch as they relate solely to the assmnp·tion of risk 
instruction. The very least that defendant could do if 
it desires to take up the time of this court with such an 
argun1ent as made in its Point II is to tell the court how 
the instruction prejudiced it and to cite some authority 
for that proposition. This, the defendant has failed to 
do. 
In connection with this point, a recent U. S. Supreme 
Court case is l1elp.ful, H. T. Arnold v. Pan Handle & Santa 
Fe Ry. Co. (1957), 353 U.S. 360, 77 S. Ct. 840, 1 L. Ed. 
889. In this case, pursuant to Texas procedure, the trial 
court required the jury to bring in a general verdict on 
the issue of negligence, and also to make findings on 
special issues put to it by the court. The general verdict 
was favorable to petitioner, but the findings on the spe-
cial issues were in favor of the respondent, and were 
inconsistent with the general verdict. The State Appel-
late Court, applying Texas law, held that the general 
verdict must yield to the inconsistent findings on the spe-
cial issues, and that the trial court should have entered 
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judgment for the respondent. In a per curiam opinion, 
the court stated at page 841: 
~~The petitioner having asserted federal 
right~ governed by federal la'"·, it is our duty 
under the Act to make certain that they are fully 
protected, as the Congress intended them to be. 
We therE\fore cannot accept interpretations that 
nullify their effectiveness, for ' ... the assertion 
of Federal rights, when plainly and reasonably 
1r4ade, is n,.ot to be defeated under the na.me of 
local practice.'·' 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERRO·R IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 16. 
Defendant in its Point III, in 'vhat may be inter-
preted to be desperation, clai1ns that someho"r the. trial 
court inserted racial prejudice into this case in Instruc-
tion 16. Such a contention is utterly ridiculous. Ho"r de-
fendant can "\Yarp the "Tord ''type'' into anything having 
to do "\Yith racial prejudice seems beyond the imagination. 
Certainly no jury can be accused of engaging in such 
imaginative thinking as has gone into defendant's Point 
III. 
The evidence produced in the case legitimately raised 
a question as to whether or not defendant should ,have 
provided a larger c.re\Y so that the tin1e of exposure to 
the elements 'vould have been reduced and the time avail-
able to warm at the fire increased. Plaintiff testified 
that a larger c.rew would have reduced his exposure. The 
court properly instructed that the railroad had the duty 
of cxPr<'i~ing rPaHonable care in providing cre\\Ts. This 
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c.an be the only interpretation of the 1neaning of Instruc-
tion No. 16, and ~uch a consideration is in keeping \vith 
the cases cited herein dealing \vith this duty on the part 
of the railroad co1npany. See Davis v. l.,..irginian Rail-
lcay Co.; Blair v. Balt·itnore & Ohio RR Co.; Bourquet v. 
Atchison, 17• & S. F. Ry. Co.; Southern Ry. Co. v. Welch; 
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. TVinder; n" orthern Pacific 
RR Co. v. llcrbert; Flike v. Boston & Albany RR Co.; 
Palum v. Lehigh 1' alley RR Co.; Dunn v. Conenlaugh 
and Black Lick RR.; Cahill v. Neu) York, New Haven & 
Hartford RR Co.; (all cited supra). 
The follo\ving language in th·e Blair case is worthy 
of repetition: 
'~'The nature of the duty which the petitioner 
\\~as commanded to undertake, the dangers of mov-
ing a greased, 1000 lb. steel tube, 30 feet in length, 
on a 5 foot truck, the area over \vhich that truck 
"'"as con1pelled to be moved, the suitableness of 
the tools used in an extraordinary manner to 
acco1nplish a novel purpose, the number of men 
n.ssig ned to assist hint, the.ir experience in such 
work and their ability to perform the duties and 
tlze 1nan ner in which they performed those duties 
- all of these raised questions ap·propriate for 
a jury to appraise in considering whether or not 
the injury \vas the result of negligence as alleged 
in the ro1nplaint.'' 
It is respectfully submitted that there could be no 
prejudicial error contained in Instruction No. 16. Cer-
tainlY such overlv refined and imaginative thinking as 
. . 
has been indulged in by defendant in this point would 
make it so that there could never be a set of instructions 
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given by a trial judge without some kind of error. 
The following language from Judge Crockett's opin-
ion in the Moore case, supra, is appropriate, page 265 : 
'~It is of the greatest practical importance for 
the efficient and sensible administration of justice 
that we give more than lip service to our rules 
and our judicial pronouncements that technical 
errors should be disregarded, and that a judg-
ment should not be vacated unless there is error 
\vhich is substantial and prejudicial, and that a 
new trial should only be granted when there is 
a reasonable likelihood that, in the absence of 
error, there would be a different result.'' 
P·OIN'T IV 
THE AWARD BY THE JURY WAS NOT EXCESSIVE 
D:efendant in its Point \,.I complains for the first 
time that the an1ount of the a\\~ard "-ras excessive. It 
should be emphasized that this is the first time this point 
has been raised. At the time of the verdict, and shortly 
thereafter, defendant \Yas not so shocked by the amount 
that it made any complaint. The only conclusion "~e can 
draw is that this is one n1ore desperate effort by defend-
ant to thro\v anything it ran into the hopper. It "~11 be 
recalled that prior to the incident in question, plaintiff 
had lost the middle finger of his left hand. The loss of 
the two additional fingers left plaintiff \Yith nothing 
more than a forefinger and a thun1b. Dr. Clegg testified 
that the loss of the t\vo additional fingers gaYP hi1n an 
additional disabilit~~ of 25 per cent over and above \vhat 
he had prior to the injury. l~laintiff is a. 55-year-old 
laboring 1nan \\·ith no skills other than the use of his 
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hand~. An injury that reduces his left hand to nothing 
but a prong of a forefinger and a thumb is a substantial 
injury to such a rnan. In all good common sense, it cannot 
earnestly be asserted that such an award \vas one given 
under the influence of passion and prejudice. 
The trial court submitted this case to the jury under 
correct instructions. Defendant had its day in Court. Its 
argument that it had no duty toward protecting its em-
ployees fro1n such excpssive and e~xtreme E~xposure as hap-
pened in this case was rep·udiated by the jury. The. jury 
did not approve such an attitude of callousness toward 
its employes as vvas exhibited by defendant in the case 
at bar. This verdict was in keeping with the humanitarian 
purpose of t,he Federal Employers' Liability Act and with 
the recent cases which have vigilantly and zealously pro-
tected the ri~ght to a jury trial in keeping vvith the intent 
of Congress in the passage of the Act. The U. S. Supreme 
Court is constantly guarding against ''the kind of luis-
conception .evident in the opinion belo,,~ \Vhich fails to 
take into account the special feature~ of thi~ statutory 
negligence action and make it signifieantly different from 
the ordinary common-law negligence action." 
FELA cases must be considered separately and apart 
from ordinary negligence cases, as has been stated tirne 
and again by the (T. S. Supreme Court and lesser courts 
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in obedience to it. It is submitted that these recent strong 
pronouncements are conspicuously absent from the brief 
submitted by defendant. In keeping with them, the judg-
ment on the jury's verdict in this case must be affinned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
~JOHN L. BLACK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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